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1974] NOTES
sought by the 1971 revisions37 and it is hoped that the holding of
Ehmig will not be extended to apply to these other steps in the
disciplinary procedure.
David R. Burch
MITCHELL V. W.T. GRANT CO.: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REEXAMINED
A seller filed suit for the overdue balance of the price of goods
purchased under an installment sales contract, and upon his ex parte
application, the trial judge ordered a sequestration of the goods with-
out affording the buyer notice or an opportunity for a prior hearing.
The lower courts denied the buyer's motion to dissolve the writ, and
the Louisiana supreme court affirmed.' On certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court held that the Louisiana writ of sequestration
is not violative of procedural due process, as it effects a "constitu-
tional accomodation" of the conflicting interests of buyer and seller.
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
Close scrutiny of traditional creditors' remedies generated by an
increased awareness of the rights of consumers underlies two recent
United States Supreme Court decisions: Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.' and Fuentes v. Shevin.3 In Sniadach the Court held unconsti-
since the question of "serious crime" has already been determined? Must the determi-
nation of whether the crime warrants discipline be made before the commissioner is
appointed as well as by him? Though it would be possible to limit Ehmig to the interim
suspension, the court may not be given that chance. It is possible that the Committee
will feel obligated to hold a hearing after final conviction to insure that the proceedings
would not possibly be found defective by the court for failure to do so.
37. Such a delay could be as long as five years from date of conviction until final
disciplinary action. In Louisiana St. Bar Ass'n. v. Funderburk, 284 So. 2d 564 (La.
1973), the grounds for disbarment were conviction of a felony and professional miscon-
duct, thus the procedure for professional misconduct was used. The defendant pleaded
guilty on November 12, 1970; he received notice of the disciplinary hearing in May,
1971. The formal hearing was held October 13, 1972. Thereafter, a petition was filed
with the supreme court for disbarment and a commissioner was appointed on Decem-
ber 6, 1972. The commissioner's hearing was held on March 22, 1973, and his report
filed with the court on July 22, 1973. He was disbarred on October 29, 1973, a delay of
thirty-five months. Had Funderburk not pleaded guilty there would have been further
delays. In Louisiana St. Bar Ass'n. v. Ponder, 263 La. 743, 269 So. 2d 228 (1972), the
defendant was convicted on December 29, 1969. His conviction became final upon the
United States Supreme Court's denial of writ of certiorari on February 22, 1972, a delay
of twenty-five months.
1. W.T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 263 La. 627, 269 So. 2d 186 (1972).
2. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
3. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Fuentes was decided with a companion case, Parham v.
Cortese. Id.
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tutional as a violation of procedural due process a Wisconsin statute
which allowed prejudgment garnishment of wages without prior no-
tice to the wage-earner. Emphasizing the specialized nature of wages,
even temporary deprivation of which might impose tremendous hard-
ship,4 the Sniadach Court felt compelled to depart from previous
decisions 5 which had declared prejudgment garnishment and other
similar provisional remedies valid under due process. Some subse-
quent lower federal and state court decisions read Sniadach as a
limited exception to the prior jurisprudence, applicable only when
wages and other specialized types of property were involved,6 while
others extracted from the case a broad constitutional mandate
4. 395 U.S. at 340.
5. In Ownbey v. Morgan, 265 U.S. 94 (1921), the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Delaware's foreign attachment law which required that the defen-
dant post security in the amount of the value of the property attached before he could
even appear and defend on the merits. The Court in Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett,
277 U.S. 29 (1928), upheld a Georgia statute that authorized the superintendent of
banks to issue an execution against the property of stockholders of defunct banks who
had failed to pay stock assessments, rejecting the contention of the petitioners that
they were deprived of due process because the execution and the creation of a lien on
their property came before and without any judicial proceedings. It found that "noth-
ing is more common than to allow parties alleging themselves to be creditors to estab-
lish in advance by attachment a lien dependent for its effect upon the result of the
suit." Id. at 31. In McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'dper curiam,
279 U.S. 820 (1928), the constitutionality of a Maine statute which permitted attach-
ment without affidavit or bond in advance of judgment was upheld. In his dissent in
Sniadach, Justice Black referred to McInnes and Ownbey and said, "I can only con-
clude that the Court is today overruling a number of its own decisions and abandoning
the legal customs and practices in this country with reference to attachments and
garnishments wholly on the ground that the garnishment laws of this kind are based
on unwise policies of government which might some time in the future do injury to
some individuals." 395 U.S. at 350. But see Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 536,
488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), where the California supreme court found that
"Sniadach does not mark a radical departure in constitutional adjudication. It is not
a rivulet of wage garnishment but part of the mainstream of the past procedural due
process decisions of the United States Supreme Court." Id. at 550, 488 P.2d at 22, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 718. For an excellent discussion of the role of Sniadach as a jurispruden-
tial catalyst see Hawkland, The Seed of Sniadach: Flower or Weed?, 79 CASE & COM.
3 (1974).
6. See, e.g., American Oil Co. v. McMullin, 433 F.2d 1091 (10th Cir. 1970); Reeves
v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Black Watch Farms, Inc.
v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (Conn. 1971); American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317
F. Supp. 150 (Hawaii 1970); Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970); First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Pomona Mach. Co., 107 Ariz. 286, 486 P.2d 184 (1971);
Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969); 300 West 154th
Street Realty Co. v. Department of Bldgs., 26 N.Y.2d 538, 260 N.E.2d 534, 311
N.Y.S.2d 899 (Ct. App. 1970).
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against all prejudgment seizures effected without notice or an oppor-
tunity for a prior hearing being given the debtor.7
The Court in Fuentes ended the speculation that Sniadach was
limited to specialized property when it struck down Florida and
Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes which allowed the sei-
zure of a debtor's property without first giving him notice.' Intensify-
ing the impact of the case was the Court's ruling that although the
buyers under the conditional sales agreement lacked full legal title
to the seized property, their possessory interest in the goods was
sufficient to bring them under the protection of the due process
clause? Furthermore, though the deprivation of property was tempo-
rary and non-final, it was "nonetheless a 'deprivation' in the terms
of the Fourteenth Amendment" in the Court's view.10 Noting that the
Florida law operated automatically upon a party's "bare assertion"
that he was entitled to the writ of replevin," and that the Pennsyl-
vania statute required even less,'2 the Court stressed that such unilat-
eral invocation of state power 3 was inconsistent with the opposing
7. See, e.g., Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Collins v. The
Viceroy Hotel Corp., 388 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F.
Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Randone
v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971); Jones Press
Inc. v. Motor Travel Serv., Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970); Larson v.
Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
8. The two Supreme Court decisions which dealt with due process requirements
of notice and hearing between Sniadach and Fuentes did not help in clearing the
uncertainty created by the former decision. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969),
the Court held that notice and a prior hearing were required before a state could
terminate welfare benefits. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), the Court held that
a prior hearing on the question of possible liability was required before the state could
revoke the license of an uninsured motorist who had not provided security out of which
claims arising from an accident could be paid. Since both decisions dealt with special-
ized types of property, the question of whether Sniadach extended to all property
interests was left unanswered. Moreover, both cases dealt with action by state agencies
against private individuals and not with conflicting interests of private parties. Ander-
son & L'Enfant, Fuentes v. Shevin: Procedural Due Process and Louisiana Creditor's
Remedies, 33 LA. L. REV. 62, 67-68 (1972).
9. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972).
10. Id. at 85.
11. Id. at 74.
12. "Unlike the Florida statute, however, the Pennsylvania law does not require
that there ever be opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the conflicting claims to
possession of the replevied property . . . . Indeed, he need not even formally allege
that he is lawfully entitled to the property. The most that is required is that he file an
'affidavit of the value of the property to be replaced.'" 407 U.S. at 77-78.
13. Speaking of the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes, the Court noted: "private
parties, serving their own private advantage, may unilaterally invoke state power to
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party's constitutional right to be heard 4 and that the debtor was not
sufficiently protected by the requirement that the creditor post
bond.' In establishing a sweeping and rigid standard for testing the
constitutionality of prejudgment creditor remedies, the Court ne-
gated any distinction between property that was "necessary" and
that which was not'" and held that, absent a "truly unusual" situa-
tion7 or a clear contractual waiver," the debtor had to be given notice
replevy goods from another. No state official participates in the decision to seek a writ;
no state official reviews the basis for the claim to repossession; and no state official
evaluates the need for immediate seizure. There is not even a requirement that the
plaintiff provide any information to the court on these matters. The State acts largely
in the dark." Id. at 93. (footnote omitted).
14. Id. at 80-81: "The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty
of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to deprive a
person of his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure abstract
fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and
possession of property from arbitrary encroachment-to minimize substantially unfair
or mistaken deprivations of property, a danger that is especially great when the State
seizes goods simply upon the application of and for the benefit of a private party."
15. Id. at 83. The Court found the bond requirement no substitute "for the right
to a prior hearing that is the only truly effective safeguard against arbitrary deprivation
of property." Id.
16. Id. at 90: "The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of 'property' generally. And,
under our free-enterprise system, an individual's choices in the marketplace are re-
spected, however unwise they may seem to someone else. It is not the business of a
court adjudicating due process rights to make its own critical evaluation of those
choices and protect only the ones that, by its own lights, are 'necessary.' "
17. "Only in a few limited situations has this Court allowed outright seizure
without opportunity for a prior hearing. First, in each case, the seizure has been
directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest.
Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept
strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure
has been a government official responsible for determining under the standards of a
narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance.
Thus, the Court has allowed summary seizure of property to collect the internal reve-
nue of the United States [Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931)], to meet the
needs of a national war effort [Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 566
(1921)], to protect against the economic disaster of a bank failure [Fahey v. Mallonee,
332 U.S. 245 (1947)], and to protect the public from misbranded drugs [Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950)] and contaminated food [North
American Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908)]." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 90-92 (1972).
18. In an earlier decision, Overmeyer v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174 (1972), the Court
upheld a contractual waiver of due process rights because it found that the waiver had
been voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. However, in Fuentes, the Court
found no showing that the petitioners were aware of the significance of the fine print
in the contract relied upon as a waiver, nor was it shown that the language of the
contractual waiver actually constituted a waiver of a prior hearing. The Court stressed
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and an opportunity for a hearing before property in which he had any
substantial interest could be seized.
With few exceptions,'" the lower courts applied the Fuentes ra-
tionale to invalidate numerous state statutes which allowed provi-
sional seizure without the requisite notice and hearing,'" a develop-
ment which made questionable the validity of several Louisiana pro-
visional remedies,2' including the writ of sequestration." Under the
Louisiana sequestration procedure, the clerk of court has the power
to sign an order for the issuance of a writ upon the ex parte applica-
tion of the claimant, except in Orleans Parish23 where the judge must
that "a waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be clear."
407 U.S. at 95. See generally Anderson, A Proposed Solution for the Commercial World
to the Sniadach-Fuentes Problem: Contractual Waiver, 79 CASE & COM. 24 (1974).
19. For example, the Arizona supreme court refused to follow Fuentes and to
overthrow Arizona's prejudgment garnishment and attachment statutes because it felt
that a mere four to three decision was not sufficient authority to justify declaring long-
established laws unconstitutional. Roofing Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Palmer, 108 Ariz.
508, 502 P.2d 1327 (1972). Contra, Western Coach Corp. v. Shreve, 475 F.2d 754 (9th
Cir. 1973).
20. See, e.g., Yates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 362 F. Supp. 520 (M.D. Ala. 1973)
(detinue statute); Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (S.D.
Me. 1973) (statute allowing prejudgment attachment of real estate); Mason v. Garris,
360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (statute allowing foreclosure on mechanics' liens);
Sena v. Montoya, 346 F. Supp. 5 (N.M. 1972) (replevin statutes); Brunswick Corp. v.
Galaxy Cocktail Lounge, Inc., 513 P.2d 1390 (Hawaii 1973) (prejudgment garnishment
procedure as applied to bank accounts); Olympic Forest Prod., Inc., v. Chaussee Corp.,
82 Wash. 2d 418, 511 P.2d 1002 (1973) (prejudgment garnishment statute). The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals followed Fuentes in Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir.
1972) (Texas landlord lien statute which allowed seizure of personal property without
prior hearing when rent not paid declared unconstitutional) and Turner v. Colonial
Fin. Corp., 467 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1972) (Mississippi replevin statute overturned).
21. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3541 (attachment); Id. art. 2631 (executory process); Id.
art. 3571 (sequestration). See Anderson & L'Enfant, Fuentes v. Shevin: Procedural
Due Process and Louisiana Creditor's Remedies, 33 LA. L. REV. 62 (1972); Comment,
47 Tul. L. Rev. 806 (1973).
22. "Sequestration is a mesne process by which a writ is issued at the commence-
ment of or pending an action, enabling the claimant to have property in the possession
of the defendant or a third person taken into legal custody until after judgment so that
the property may be delivered to the party adjudged to be entitled to it, where the
defendant has the power to place the claimant in a disadvantageous position and the
claim is against the particular property. The remedy of sequestration derives from
French and Spanish law and rests on principles originating in Roman Law. The remedy
has remained in Louisiana law in substantially the same form from the beginning
... " Johnson, Attachment and Sequestration: Provisional Remedies Under the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 38 TUL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1963).
23. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 281: "The provisions of Articles 282 through 286 [which
allow the clerks of district courts to sign an order for the issuance of a writ of sequestra-
tion] do not apply to the clerk and the deputy clerks of the Civil District Court for
the Parish of Orleans."
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sign the order. If the plaintiff furnishes the appropriate security24 and
claims ownership, a right to possession, or a security interest in the
property, it then may be taken into legal custody without prior notice
or hearing." The defendant remains dispossessed of the property dur-
ing the pendency of the action unless he files a motion to dissolve the
writ, and proves at a subsequent contradictory hearing that the plain-
tiff is not entitled to the provisional remedy,26 or until he posts bond
for the satisfaction of any judgment which may be rendered against
him.27 Since the procedure requires neither notice nor hearing, it
seemed unlikely that it would withstand constitutional scrutiny
under the test prescribed by Fuentes.
In the instant case,2" however, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the procedure as applied in Orleans Parish and distinguished
Fuentes by pointing to four major differences in the creditors' reme-
dies challenged in the two cases. First, in contrast to the replevin
statutes, which required only "bare conclusionary claims of owner-
ship or lien," the Louisiana statutes authorize the issuance of a writ
of sequestration only upon specific factual allegations." Next, the
Court contrasted the Florida and Pennsylvania procedures, which
allowed issuance of the writ by a court clerk, with Orleans Parish
24. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3574.
25. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3571: "When one claims the ownership or right to posses-
sion of property, or a mortgage, lien, or privilege thereon, he may have the property
seized under a writ of sequestration, if it is within the power of the defendant to
conceal, dispose of, or waste the property or the revenues therefrom, or remove the
property from the parish, during the pendency of the action." It is not necessary that
the plaintiff have reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant intends to conceal
or destroy the property as long as it is within his power to do so. Gueydan v. T.P. Ranch
Co., 156 La. 397, 100 So. 541 (1924). The grounds relied upon for issuance of the writ
must be shown by specific factual allegations of the claimant. LA. CODE CIv. P. art.
3501. Louisiana courts have strictly enforced this provision. See, e.g., Hancock Bank
v. Alexander, 256 La. 643, 237 So. 2d 669 (1970); Wright v. Hughes, 254 So. 2d 293
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
26. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3506.
27. Id. arts. 3507, 3508.
28. The Louisiana supreme court had upheld the sequestration statute based on
two premises. First, the court found the instant case came within the exception pro-
vided by Fuentes that where the creditor can show that there is immediate danger that
the debtor will destroy or conceal the goods, seizure before notice and hearing may be
justified. Second, the court held that a buyer takes possession of the property with an
implied-in-law knowledge of the vendor's privilege, thus consenting to the seller's
repossession without notice when a default in payments occurs. W.T. Grant Co. v.
Mitchell, 263 La. 627, 269 So. 2d 186 (1972). For a critical evaluation of the opinion,
see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Procedure,
34 LA. L. REV. 379, 391 (1974).
29. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1904 (1974). See note 25 supra.
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procedure requiring the applicant for the writ to make the requisite
showings to a judge." Third, while the statutes at issue in'Fuentes
had permitted replevy of the property only if it.had been "wrongfully
detained," thereby erecting a broad fault standard inappropriate for
preliminary ex parte determination, Louisiana limits the preliminary
issues to a factual determination of the existence vel non of the ven-
dor's privilege and a default by the debtor.3" Since documentary proof
is especially suited for this determination, it was reasoned that there
is little danger of mistaken seizure and "a corresponding decrease in
the utility of an adversary hearing which will be immediately avail-
able in any event."32 Finally, the Court found that the express provi-
sion for a contradictory hearing to dissolve the writ, at which the
creditor must prove he is entitled to the writ, prevents the Louisiana
debtor from being "left in limbo to await a hearing that might or
might not 'eventually' occur," as was the debtor's fate under the
statutory schemes involved in Fuentes.3 Based on these comparisons,
the Court was
convinced that Fuentes was decided against a factual and legal
background sufficiently different from that now before us and
that it does not require the invalidation of the Louisiana seques-
tration statute, either on its face or as applied in this case. 34
Despite the Court's careful attempts to distinguish rather than
overrule Fuentes, a close examination of Mitchell reveals a significant
departure from the Fuentes standard of procedural due process and
a return to the rule that where only property rights are involved,
postponement of judicial enquiry does not necessarily violate due
process . 3 The debtor's right to a prior hearing that compelled the
decision in Fuentes was now eclipsed by the Court's renewed recogni-
30. Id. at 1904-05: "[In the parish where the case arose, the requisite showing
must be made to a judge and judicial authorization obtained. Mitchell was not at the
unsupervised mercy of the creditor and court functionaries. The Louisiana law pro-
vides for judicial control of the process from beginning to end. This control is one of
the measures adopted by the State to minimize the risk that the ex parte procedure
will lead to a wrongful taking."
31. Id. at 1905.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. While Fuentes had stressed that any significant property interest is entitled
to procedural due process protections in the form of a prior hearing, the Court con-
cluded in Mitchell that "[tihe usual rule has been '[wihere only property rights are
involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if
the opportunity given for ultimate judicial determination of liability is adequate.' "Id.
at 1902. As authority for this general proposition, the Court cited the case of Ewing v.
19741
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tion of the creditor's strong interest" in protecting the property from
action by the debtor which might erode" or destroy38 that interest.
Safeguards other than notice and hearing were deemed sufficient to
satisfy due process, and the requirement that the creditor post bond,
rejected in Fuentes as inadequate, was cited by the Mitchell Court
as one factor which saved the Louisiana procedure from being uncon-
stitutional.3" In contrast to the Fuentes conceptualization of proce-
dural due process as a provision designed "to protect the particular
interest of the person whose possessions are about to be taken,"4 the
Court in the instant case applied a balancing of interests test sensi-
tive to the realities of the creditor-debtor relationship.' Searching for
a "constitutional accommodation" of the conflicting interests," the
Court found that the creditor's strong interest coupled with the lim-
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950). The Fuentes majority had cited this
same case as an example of an extraordinary situation, i.e., protecting the public from
misbranded drugs, that justified seizure without a prior hearing. 407 U.S. at 92 & n.27.
36. The Court emphasized the fact that although the buyer no doubt owned the
goods he had purchased under the installment sales contract, his title was heavily
encumbered by the existence of a vendor's privilege (LA. CiV. CODE art. 3227) on the
goods. 94 S. Ct. at 1898. This security interest of the seller, measured by the unpaid
balance of the purchase price, was deemed sufficient for the state to protect. By
contrast, the Fuentes Court found that an even stronger interest, legal title, did not
justify depriving the debtor of his right to a prior hearing. It was on this point of
creditor interest that Sniadach was summarily disposed of, the Court finding that the
"suing creditor in Sniadach had no prior interest in the property attached, and the
opinion did not purport to govern the typical case of the installment seller who brings
a suit to collect an unpaid balance and who does not seek to attach wages pending the
outcome of the suit but to repossess the sold property on which he had retained a lien
to secure the purchase price." Id. at 1904. Thus, in its assessment of Sniadach the
Court seemingly adopted the view of those pre-Fuentes decisions which had read
Sniadach as a limited exception for wages and other specialized types of property. See
cases cited at note 6 supra.
37. "Clearly, if payments cease and possession and use by the buyer continue, the
seller's interest in the property as security is steadily and irretrievably eroded until the
time at which the full hearing is held." 94 S. Ct. at 1900.
38. Noting that the vendor's privilege expires if the buyer transfers possession of
the property, the Court found that "[tihe danger of destruction or alienation cannot
be guarded against if notice and a hearing before seizure are supplied. The notice itself
may furnish a warning to the debtor acting in bad faith." Id. at 1901.
39. Id. at 1900.
40. 407 U.S. at 90 n.22.
41. The entire decision is based on the premise that "[rlesolution of the due
process question must take account not only of the interests of the buyer of the prop-
erty but those of the seller as well." 94 S. Ct. at 1898.
42. Cf. The court's language in Fuentes: "Procedural due process is not intended
to promote efficiency or accommodate all possible interests. 407 U.S. at 90 n.22
(emphasis added).
NOTES
ited hardship to the debtor as well as the presence of judicial supervi-
sion and the ultimate protection of the prevailing party against all
loss, justified its new position with regard to creditors' remedies.43
The Court's limited distinction of Fuentes seems accurate to the
extent that it found the Florida and Pennsylvania statutory schemes
less protective of the interests of the debtor than the Louisiana proce-
dure. However, a critical reading of the opinion leads to the inescapa-
ble conclusion that it goes much further than it purports to. In fact,
to the extent that Fuentes required prior notice and opportunity for
a hearing in every case in which "no more than private gain is directly
at stake,"4 it is probably overruled.4 5
Although Mitchell is clear in its "reaffirmation of the traditional
meaning of procedural due process,"" its treatment of the writ of
sequestration leaves questions unanswered. For instance, it is uncer-
tain whether the emphasis placed on judicial supervision limits the
holding of constitutionality only to the sequestration procedure as
effected in Orleans Parish." The fact that a clerk of court rather than
a judge issues the writ would seem to be a narrow reason for holding
43. 94 S. Ct. at 1906.
44. 407 U.S. at 92.
45. Justice Powell's analysis of the holding in his concurring opinion is probably
accurate in its assessment of the implications of the Mitchell decision: "In sweeping
language, Fuentes . . .enunciated the principle that the constitutional guarantee of
procedural due process requires an adversary hearing before an individual may be
temporarily deprived of any possessory interest in tangible personal property, however
brief the dispossession and however slight his monetary interest in the property. The
Court's decision today withdraws significantly from the full reach of that principle, and
to this extent I think it is fair to say that the Fuentes opinion is overruled. . . .It
seems to me . . .that it was unnecessary for the Fuentes opinion to have adopted so
broad and inflexible a rule, especially one that considerably altered settled law with
respect to commercial transactions and basic creditor-debtor understandings. Nar-
rower grounds existed for invalidating the replevin statutes in that case." 94 S. Ct. at
1908 (concurring opinion). The dissent also agrees with Justice Powell in finding that
"this case is constitutionally indistinguishable from Fuentes v. Shevin, and the Court
today has simply rejected the reasoning of that case and adopted instead the analysis
of the Fuentes dissent." Id. at 1913 (Stewart, Douglas & Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1910 (Powell, J., concurring). The entire majority opinion is predicated
on a flexible concept of due process. "The requirements of due process of law are not
technical, nor is any form of procedure necessary. . . .Due process of law guarantees
no particular form of procedure; it protects substantial rights. . . .The very nature
of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to
every imaginable situation." Id. at 1901 (citations omitted).
47. The Court specifically stated: "The validity of procedures obtaining outside
of Orleans Parish is not at issue." Id. at 1899 n.5. In addition, the Court predicted that
its decision in the instant case would not affect past decisions invalidating replevin or
similar statutes, since in those cases it wasn't clear that "there was judicial supervision
of seizure or foreclosure from the outset." Id. at 1906 n.14 (emphasis added).
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the sequestration procedure used elsewhere in the state violative of
due process, since the debtor's interests are still protected by his right
to an immediate hearing and the creditor's security bond.48 Similarly,
the finding by the Court that the debtor's interests are adequately
protected by this security bond leaves questionable the validity of
using the writ of sequestration in those situations where no security
is required, e.g., enforcement of a lessor's privilege.49
Whatever the specific limitations of Mitchell, the decision is
indicative of a new attitude" in the Supreme Court toward creditors'
remedies.5' No longer will per se application of a requirement of prior
48. In his dissent, Justice Stewart found that "the fact that the official who signs
the writ after the ex parte application is a judge instead of a court clerk is of no
constitutional significance. Outside of Orleans Parish, this same function is performed
by the court clerk . . . . Whether the issuing functionary be a judge or a court clerk,
he can in any event do no more than ascertain the formal sufficiency of the plaintiff's
allegations, after which the issuance of the summary writ becomes a simple ministerial
act." Id. at 1912. There may be some support for the argument that the clerk does
perform a judicial function in signing the order, thus complying with the standard of
judicial supervision stressed in Mitchell. "It is uniformly held that clerks of court have
no judicial authority except by constitutional or legislative provisions." Hicks v.
Hughes, 223 La. 290, 296, 65 So. 2d 603, 605 (1953) (emphasis added). LA. CODE Civ.
P. art. 283 provides in part that a district court clerk may sign "[ain order for the
issuance . . . of a writ of attachment or of sequestration .... " LA. CODE CIv. P. art.
282, comment (b) states that "[t]his article and Art. 283 . . . confer on the clerk of a
district court the power and authority to do certain acts, and render and sign certain
orders and judgments, which normally are done by the judge himself." Finally, it is
significant that "[tihe order authorizing the issuance of the writ and the writ itself
are distinct; the order is a judicial act while the writ is a ministerial one." Johnson,
Attachment and Sequestration: Provisional Remedies Under the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure, 38 TUL. L. REV. 1, 20 (1963) (emphasis added).
49. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3575.
50. This change of attitude is probably not so much a result of a change in policy
or ideology as it is a reflection of a change in the membership of the Court. The same
ideas that were expressed in Fuentes were expressed in Mitchell. However, the major-
ity of four in Fuentes became a dissent of four in Mitchell, with Justice Stewart
remaining the spokesman. With the addition of Justices Powell and Rehnquist to the
Court, the three man dissent in Fuentes, per Justice White, became a five man major-
ity in Mitchell. Aware of this numerical shift, the dissent remarked that "the only
perceivable change that has occurred since the Fuentes case is in the makeup of this
court." 94 S. Ct. at 1914 (dissenting opinion).
51. Significantly, the Court recently dismissed an appeal from a Louisiana su-
preme court decision upholding the validity of Louisiana's executory process. The
Court ordered the dismissal "for want of a substantial federal question." Carmack v.
Buckner, 94 S. Ct. 2594 (1974). The Louisiana supreme court found that the contrac-
tual confession of judgment under the procedure effectively waived the right to a
routine adversary hearing. Buckner v. Carmack, 272 So. 2d 326 (La. 1973). The deci-
sion is discussed along with the Louisiana supreme court's holding in Mitchell in The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Procedure, 34 LA.
L. REV. 379, 393 (1974).
19741 NOTES
notice or hearing be the norm where a creditor seeks to employ the
legal processes of a state to protect his valid interests. Mitchell pres-
ents a more realistic approach to the problems encountered in the
typical creditor-debtor relationship than did the narrow standard
espoused in Fuentes. The prior hearing, which in the majority of cases
is never utilized by the defaulting debtor,5" was unnecessarily given
sacrosanct constitutional status. The Mitchell "accommodation" test
recognizes that mutual property interests" deserve more than one-
sided protection and prevents invalidation of efficient creditors' rem-
edies.
Greg Guidry
THE NUNCUPATIVE TESTAMENT BY PUBLIC ACT: A DYING DECLARATION?
When a nuncupative testament by public act,' executed by Mrs.
Freddie Robertson Killingsworth,' was challenged by certain of her
legal heirs not named as beneficiaries,3 the legatees under the will
brought an action seeking a declaration of its validity.' On original
hearing, the Louisiana supreme court declared the will invalid, bas-
ing its decision on evidence which indicated that the notary's secre-
tary had typed the will, thereby violating the codal requirement that
the testament be written "by the notary."5 On rehearing, the court
52. "Offering the debtor an opportunity to be heard does not guarantee the debtor
will avail himself of the opportunity. The Survey [Collection Practices and Creditors'
Remedies Survey] showed that in approximately 65 percent of all court cases the
consumer failed to appear and judgment was entered by default for the creditor-
plaintiff." REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER
CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (1972).
53. "Indeed, depending on the number of installments which have been paid, the
creditor's interest may often be greater than the debtor's. Thus we deal here with
mutual property interests, both of which are entitled to be safeguarded. Fuentes over-
looked this vital point." Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1910 n.3 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring).
1. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1577, 1578.
2. The will was executed on October 7, 1955.
3. These legal heirs would have inherited nothing under the will, but would have
received 5/S's of Mrs. Killingsworth's estate had the will been declared invalid.
4. The legatees under the will enjoyed almost the entire estate of Mrs. Killing-
sworth. They were also legal heirs, however, and would have enjoyed approximately
3/8's of Mrs. Killingsworth's estate had the will been declared invalid.
5. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1578: "The nuncupative testaments by public act must be
received by a notary public, in presence of three witnesses residing in the place where
the will is executed, or of five witnesses not residing in the place.
